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Conclusions:	  Too	  little,	  too	  slow?	  
	  
Manuela	  Moschella	  and	  Eleni	  Tsingou	  
	  
	  ‘If	  there	  is	  a	  reproach	  to	  be	  made,	  it	  is	  that	  regulatory	  progress	  has	  not	  been	  faster.’	  
Andreas	  Dombret,	  Member	  of	  the	  Executive	  Board	  of	  the	  Deutsche	  Bundesbank,	  [Speech	  delivered	  at	  
the	  Global	  Seminar	  Financial	  regulation	  -­‐	  bridging	  global	  differences,	  Salzburg,]	  16	  August	  2012.	  
	  
1.	  Great	  expectations	  
As	  some	  time	  has	  now	  passed	  since	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  controversial	  to	  
claim	  that	  a	  crisis	  that	  originated	  in	  the	  small	  subprime	  mortgage	  market	  in	  the	  United	  States	  triggered	  the	  
worst	  global	  downturn	  since	  the	  Great	  Depression.	  Echoing	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  1930s	  crisis,	  the	  world	  
witnessed	  an	  unusually	  sharp	  drop	  in	  asset	  prices	  and	  output,	  followed	  by	  the	  failure	  and	  near-­‐failure	  of	  
prominent	  financial	  institutions,	  all	  of	  which	  culminated	  into	  by	  generalised	  financial	  distress	  (Eichengreen	  
2012).	  Analogies	  with	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression	  were	  largely	  drawn	  to	  justify	  unconventional	  
monetary	  policy	  by	  central	  banks:	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  a	  repeat	  of	  the	  1930s	  cascade	  of	  financial	  failures,	  
monetary	  authorities	  around	  the	  world	  acted	  decisively	  in	  pumping	  liquidity.	  Next	  to	  monetary	  policy,	  
however,	  the	  other	  policy	  area	  where	  the	  Great	  Depression	  analogy	  has	  been	  largely	  evoked	  is	  that	  of	  
financial	  regulation.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  1930s,	  when	  a	  regulatory	  clampdown	  on	  banking	  activity	  was	  adopted	  
to	  restore	  confidence	  in	  the	  US	  financial	  sector,	  the	  crisis	  that	  started	  in	  2007	  raised	  expectations	  of	  a	  
profound	  overhaul	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  and	  its	  global	  interconnectedness,	  that	  is,	  the	  factors	  that	  were	  
understood	  to	  be	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  crisis.	  Public	  mobilisation	  against	  the	  banks,	  the	  pronouncements	  of	  
key	  leaders	  and	  regulators,	  which	  did	  not	  shy	  away	  from	  comparing	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  environment	  to	  the	  
‘Bretton	  Woods	  moment’	  that	  materialised	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  1930s,	  were	  all	  signs	  suggesting	  that	  a	  quick	  
and	  substantial	  (re)regulation	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  sector	  was	  on	  the	  agenda	  and	  about	  to	  take	  place.	  
However,	  this	  book	  offers	  a	  sober	  assessment	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  policy-­‐makers	  exploited	  the	  window	  of	  
opportunity	  provided	  by	  the	  crisis.	  Rather	  than	  a	  decisive	  intervention	  to	  fix	  the	  problems	  exposed	  by	  the	  
crisis,	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  regulatory	  reform	  process	  has	  proceeded	  quite	  slowly	  and	  by	  way	  of	  marginal	  
adjustments.	  If	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  holds	  that	  turning	  points,	  such	  as	  an	  external	  shock,	  usually	  bring	  
major	  intellectual	  reassessment	  and	  policy	  changes,	  the	  cases	  in	  this	  book	  in	  fact	  show	  that	  the	  ‘external	  
shock’	  of	  the	  crisis	  has	  not	  led	  to	  such	  comprehensive	  overhaul.	  Rather	  than	  rapidly	  lurching	  forward	  on	  the	  
heels	  of	  economic	  disruptions	  and	  popular	  discontent,	  the	  key	  feature	  of	  the	  regulatory	  reform	  has	  been	  its	  
incremental,	  non-­‐paradigmatic	  dynamics.	  	  
While	  incremental	  change	  is	  neither	  wrong	  nor	  bad	  in	  principle,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  problematic	  for	  the	  post-­‐
crisis	  regulatory	  agenda.	  The	  problem	  derives	  from	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  political	  scientists	  know	  quite	  well,	  the	  
window	  of	  opportunity	  does	  not	  stay	  open	  for	  a	  long	  time	  –	  and	  when	  it	  shuts	  down,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  restore	  
the	  conditions	  favouring	  the	  changes	  that	  had	  seemingly	  just	  been	  possible.	  This	  is	  exactly	  the	  risk	  that	  is	  
materialising	  as	  the	  centre	  stage	  of	  the	  crisis	  moves	  from	  the	  financial	  sector	  to	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  market.	  
As	  the	  overriding	  focus	  of	  policy	  makers	  is	  shifting	  to	  Europe’s	  financial	  turmoil	  and	  the	  impact	  it	  could	  have	  
on	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  it	  has	  not	  been	  uncommon	  to	  hear	  calls	  to	  water	  down	  or	  delay	  regulatory	  reform.	  
An	  excessive	  regulatory	  pressure,	  so	  the	  argument	  goes,	  could	  put	  at	  risk	  the	  global	  economic	  recovery,	  
exactly	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  euro	  crisis	  is	  already	  impairing	  the	  global	  growth	  prospects.	  
However,	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  in	  Europe	  is	  a	  major	  source	  of	  risk	  to	  global	  
stability,	  it	  would	  be	  not	  only	  mistaken	  but	  also	  dangerous	  to	  slow	  further	  down	  the	  financial	  regulatory	  
reform	  process.	  To	  start	  with,	  the	  same	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis,	  which	  is	  not	  least	  driven	  by	  systemic	  
problems	  in	  some	  countries’	  banking	  systems,	  underscores	  the	  urgent	  need	  to	  make	  the	  financial	  system	  
more	  resilient.	  Furthermore,	  the	  financial	  sector	  is	  still	  a	  major	  source	  of	  potential	  risk.	  For	  instance,	  many	  
banks	  remain	  highly	  leveraged,	  including	  those	  that	  appear	  well	  capitalised	  (Bank	  for	  International	  
Settlements	  2012:	  5)	  and	  the	  level	  of	  risk	  is	  growing	  also	  in	  the	  banks	  that	  were	  saved	  by	  public	  money	  
(Brei	  and	  Gadanecz	  2012).	  In	  short,	  the	  ‘problems	  with	  banks’	  is	  far	  from	  having	  been	  solved	  (Rethel	  and	  
Sinclair	  2012).	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  there	  is	  also	  mounting	  evidence	  that	  innovative	  products	  are	  already	  being	  
developed	  to	  circumvent	  some	  new	  regulations	  (IMF	  2012).	  Last,	  but	  not	  least,	  the	  financial	  scandals	  of	  the	  
last	  few	  years,	  from	  the	  fraud	  allegations	  on	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  to	  the	  mismanagement	  of	  the	  
Libor	  setting-­‐process,	  have	  not	  undermined	  but	  reinforced	  the	  case	  for	  speedier	  and	  more	  comprehensive	  
regulation.	  
The	  chapters	  collected	  in	  this	  volume	  have	  investigated	  the	  causes	  that	  help	  explain	  why	  ‘the	  regulatory	  
progress	  has	  not	  been	  faster’,	  to	  use	  the	  words	  Andreas	  Dombret,	  member	  of	  the	  Executive	  Board	  of	  the	  
Deutsche	  Bundesbank,	  in	  the	  opening	  statement	  to	  this	  concluding	  chapter.	  Specifically,	  we	  addressed	  the	  
question	  of	  why	  the	  regulatory	  reform	  process	  has	  been	  incremental	  although	  the	  conditions	  were	  in	  place	  
for	  a	  more	  decisive	  and	  radical	  outcome.	  Indeed,	  as	  clarified	  in	  the	  Introduction	  to	  this	  volume,	  the	  crisis	  
had	  opened	  up	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  rapid	  and	  radical	  reforms	  by	  significantly	  changing	  the	  
institutional	  context	  in	  which	  financial	  policy-­‐making	  takes	  place:	  public	  mobilisation	  and	  the	  shift	  of	  the	  
financial	  debate	  from	  technical	  to	  political	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  G20	  Leaders	  were	  all	  factors	  that	  led	  us	  to	  
expect	  the	  kind	  of	  punctuated	  change	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  quick	  and	  profound	  policy	  changes.	  
In	  unveiling	  the	  factors	  that	  prevented	  a	  punctuated-­‐type	  of	  change	  from	  occurring,	  we	  set	  out	  to	  make	  
both	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  contributions.	  At	  the	  empirical	  level,	  our	  study	  maps	  and	  assesses	  the	  
changes	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  a	  number	  of	  crucial	  areas	  of	  financial	  governance	  including	  financial	  
supervision	  (Baker),	  offshore	  financial	  centres	  and	  shadow	  banking	  (Rixen),	  accounting	  (Botzem),	  banking	  
governance	  infrastructure	  (Carstensen)	  and	  banking	  and	  derivatives	  regulation	  (Quaglia,	  Pagliari	  and	  
Young),	  the	  rules	  that	  apply	  to	  hedge	  funds	  and	  credit	  rating	  agencies	  in	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  (Quaglia)	  
and	  those	  that	  govern	  the	  mortgage-­‐related	  markets	  and	  products	  (Kjar).	  While	  these	  case	  studies	  do	  not	  
exhaust	  the	  regulatory	  reform	  agenda,	  they	  cover	  important	  or	  contentious	  reforms	  which	  highlight	  activity	  
at	  various	  levels	  of	  governance,	  provide	  a	  contrast	  between	  pre	  and	  post-­‐crisis	  debates,	  and	  allow	  
investigating	  the	  role	  played	  by	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  actors,	  from	  those	  that	  operate	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  
those	  in	  the	  official	  community.	  Furthermore,	  they	  provide	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  change	  across	  
governance	  levels	  and	  also,	  in	  several	  areas	  that	  are	  important	  to	  the	  workings	  of	  global	  finance	  while	  
going	  beyond	  the	  usual	  banking/securities/insurance	  subsector	  analyses	  often	  employed	  when	  studying	  
financial	  regulation	  (e.g.	  Singer	  2007).	  By	  mapping	  what	  has	  changed	  in	  these	  sectors,	  we	  also	  provide	  a	  
complementary	  analysis	  to	  those	  economic	  studies	  that	  have	  thus	  far	  investigated	  the	  progress	  that	  has	  
been	  made	  in	  making	  markets	  and	  institutions	  more	  transparent,	  less	  complex,	  and	  less	  leveraged	  (e.g.	  IMF	  
2012).	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  contributions	  collected	  in	  this	  book	  provide	  a	  theoretically	  informed	  analysis	  of	  the	  
changes	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  thus	  far.	  In	  particular,	  we	  deliberately	  decided	  not	  to	  elaborate	  new	  
concepts	  and	  theories.	  In	  contrast,	  we	  opted	  to	  build	  on	  the	  insights	  developed	  within	  the	  historical	  
institutionalist	  literature,	  which	  has	  long	  focused	  on	  processes	  of	  incremental,	  path-­‐dependent	  changes,	  
and	  to	  exploit	  the	  opportunity	  for	  fruitful	  cross-­‐fertilisation	  by	  expanding	  those	  insights	  and	  combining	  
them	  with	  those	  developed	  in	  the	  IPE	  scholarship.	  	  
The	  resulting	  theoretical	  model	  suggested	  in	  this	  volume	  builds	  on	  recent	  versions	  of	  HI	  in	  that	  it	  
incorporates	  the	  importance	  of	  normative	  underpinning	  and,	  above	  all,	  redresses	  the	  balance	  between	  
agents	  and	  institutions	  by	  taking	  a	  more	  agent-­‐centred	  perspective	  that	  emphasises	  the	  microfoundations	  
of	  political	  actors’	  preferences	  (e.g.	  Fioretos	  2011:	  373-­‐76;	  Mahoney	  and	  Thelen	  2010).	  Attention	  to	  these	  
microfoundations	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  processes	  of	  change	  examined	  in	  this	  book:	  as	  the	  constraints	  and	  
opportunities	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  institutional	  framework	  changed	  following	  the	  crisis,	  the	  calculations	  of	  
political	  actors	  also	  adapted	  and	  evolved.	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  evolved,	  however,	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
they	  were	  translated	  into	  operational	  practices,	  were	  both	  facilitated	  and	  constrained	  by	  previous	  
developments	  in	  the	  multiple	  institutions	  that	  make	  up	  global	  financial	  governance.	  Temporality	  and	  
sequence,	  institutional	  density,	  positions	  of	  power	  across	  actors	  and	  within	  networks,	  as	  well	  as	  knowledge	  
patterns	  were	  all	  factors	  that	  mediated	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  exogenous	  shock	  of	  the	  crisis	  by	  diverting	  the	  
responses	  towards	  an	  incremental	  dynamic.	  In	  other	  words,	  echoing	  findings	  at	  the	  domestic	  level,	  where	  
historically-­‐grown	  institutions	  largely	  mediate	  globalisation	  forces	  explaining	  the	  lack	  of	  policy	  converge,1	  in	  
this	  study,	  the	  historically-­‐grown	  features	  of	  global	  financial	  governance	  mediated	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  crisis	  
and	  explain	  the	  lack	  of	  profound	  overhaul	  in	  its	  aftermath.	  
Adopting	  this	  theoretical	  framework,	  as	  will	  be	  clarified	  below,	  all	  the	  chapters	  in	  this	  volume	  shed	  light	  on	  
how	  incremental	  change	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  activity	  of	  change	  actors	  and/or	  veto	  players	  that	  operate	  
within	  the	  constraints	  and	  possibilities	  defined	  by	  the	  institutional	  characteristics	  that	  global	  financial	  
governance	  has	  acquired	  over	  time.	  They	  were	  crucial	  in	  tilting	  financial	  regulation	  towards	  an	  incremental	  
dynamic	  of	  change	  because	  they	  shaped	  the	  micro-­‐level	  incentives	  for	  change	  actors	  and	  veto	  players	  to	  
change	  (or	  reproduce)	  existing	  financial	  rules	  and	  institutions.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  as	  suggested	  
in	  the	  Introduction	  of	  the	  volume,	  change	  actors	  and	  veto	  players	  did	  not	  necessarily	  perform	  different	  
roles	  in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  regulatory	  reform	  process	  –	  sponsoring	  change	  and	  opposing	  it	  respectively.	  The	  
empirical	  evidence	  is	  far	  more	  mixed,	  showing	  that	  the	  same	  set	  of	  political	  actors	  can	  act	  as	  both	  change	  
agents	  and	  veto	  players.	  	  
In	  what	  follows,	  we	  review	  the	  key	  findings	  that	  can	  be	  extrapolated	  from	  the	  empirical	  chapters	  assessing	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  lend	  support	  to	  the	  theoretical	  propositions	  staked	  out	  in	  the	  Introduction.	  
Subsequently,	  we	  move	  to	  speculate	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  reform	  process	  for	  global	  
financial	  governance.	  In	  this	  section,	  we	  also	  engage	  with	  the	  observation	  according	  to	  which	  
incrementalism	  is	  mainly	  instrumental	  and	  serves	  to	  preserve	  the	  status	  quo.	  Finally,	  we	  reflect	  on	  the	  
other	  challenges	  for	  the	  regulatory	  reform	  agenda	  and	  suggest	  some	  themes	  for	  future	  research,	  especially	  
in	  a	  comparative	  perspective.	  
	  
2.	  Summary	  of	  the	  findings	  and	  their	  implications	  
	  
What	  change?	  	  
One	  of	  the	  primary	  contributions	  of	  the	  chapters	  collected	  in	  this	  volume	  is	  that	  of	  identifying	  and	  mapping	  
the	  dynamics	  and	  the	  type	  of	  change	  that	  have	  been	  adopted	  across	  a	  number	  of	  key	  financial	  sub-­‐sectors.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  On	  the	  differences	  in	  national	  policy	  responses	  to	  external,	  common	  challenges	  see,	  among	  others,	  Berger	  and	  Dore	  
(1996);	  Schmidt	  (2002);	  Soederberg	  et	  al.	  (2005).	  
While	  all	  cases	  show	  evidence	  of	  some	  change	  and	  reform,	  the	  scope,	  pace	  and	  expected	  outcome	  of	  such	  
reform	  all	  point	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  incrementalism	  in	  understanding	  the	  process.	  	  
To	  start	  with,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  evident	  policy	  failures	  exposed	  by	  the	  crisis,	  popular	  anger	  and	  political	  support	  
for	  more	  wide-­‐ranging	  reforms,	  the	  type	  of	  changes	  that	  have	  been	  adopted	  thus	  far	  are	  mainly	  
concentrated	  at	  the	  level	  of	  policy	  instruments	  and	  settings.	  In	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  
crisis,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  pronouncements	  of	  the	  G20,	  there	  was	  a	  general	  focus	  on	  big	  policy	  areas,	  
covering	  all	  facets	  of	  financial	  activity.	  As	  reform	  proposals	  materialised,	  the	  agenda	  was	  either	  rendered	  
more	  modest	  or	  the	  tasks	  enumerated	  and	  simplified.	  This	  is	  especially	  notable	  in	  Quaglia’s	  analysis,	  as	  it	  
provides	  a	  bird’s	  eye	  view	  of	  the	  changing	  European	  regulatory	  landscape.	  Instead	  of	  comprehensive	  
reform,	  we	  see	  changes	  in	  policy	  instruments	  and	  adjustments	  to	  the	  level	  of	  regulation	  and	  composition	  of	  
the	  regulators.	  As	  such,	  Quaglia	  stresses	  that	  we	  need	  to	  see	  the	  full	  picture	  before	  we	  can	  determine	  that	  
the	  overall	  reform,	  while	  incremental,	  can	  indeed	  amount	  to	  more	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  parts.	  The	  empirical	  
cases	  in	  this	  volume	  also	  show	  contrasting	  examples	  in	  the	  potential	  importance	  of	  changes	  in	  governance	  
settings	  and	  infrastructure.	  Whereas	  Rixen,	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  offshore	  
finance	  maintains	  that	  reform	  activity	  is	  merely	  symbolic	  with	  few	  meaningful	  consequences,	  Carstensen,	  
in	  his	  discussion	  of	  cross-­‐border	  resolution	  regimes	  shows	  that	  rationalising	  bank	  resolution	  infrastructure	  
can	  potentially	  have	  wide-­‐ranging	  consequences	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  discussions	  of	  a	  European	  banking	  
union.	  
Changes	  at	  the	  level	  of	  policy	  goals	  have	  been	  quite	  rare,	  if	  not	  altogether	  absent.	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  
in	  the	  mortgage	  services	  industry	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Kjar’s	  contribution,	  and	  that	  despite	  its	  central	  role	  as	  a	  
crisis	  trigger.	  The	  main	  exception	  in	  the	  empirical	  analyses	  of	  this	  volume	  is	  the	  ideational	  change	  in	  the	  
adoption	  of	  a	  macroprudential	  regulation	  agenda	  and	  discourse	  by	  regulators	  and	  supervisors:	  this	  change	  
is	  the	  one	  are	  of	  reform	  with	  the	  closest	  resemblance	  to	  paradigmatic	  changes	  in	  Hall’s	  terminology	  (1993).	  
However,	  although	  Baker	  accounts	  for	  this	  development	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  policy	  paradigm,	  his	  
assessment	  of	  the	  shift	  from	  micro	  to	  macroprudential	  regulation	  also	  shows	  how	  this	  development	  is	  
closely	  linked	  to	  pre-­‐existing	  knowledge	  among	  regulatory	  circle	  insiders;	  macroprudential	  ideas	  are	  driven	  
by	  policy	  entrepreneurs	  that	  hold	  a	  privileged	  position	  in	  the	  relevant	  institutional	  setting	  and	  did	  so	  in	  the	  
pre-­‐crisis	  period.	  Finally,	  another	  important	  category	  of	  change	  that	  is	  possible	  to	  extrapolate	  from	  the	  
empirical	  chapters	  is	  one	  that	  pertains	  to	  the	  procedures	  according	  to	  which	  rules	  are	  created.	  In	  this	  
context,	  Quaglia	  shows	  that	  a	  pooling	  of	  sovereignty	  is	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  regulatory	  framework	  
at	  the	  European	  level,	  whereas	  Botzem	  provides	  examples	  of	  how	  changes	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  
International	  Accounting	  Standards	  Board	  (IASB)	  enabled	  that	  professional	  community	  to	  claim	  change	  was	  
taking	  place	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  more	  wholesale	  shifts	  in	  accounting	  governance.	  	  
While	  virtually	  all	  contributions	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  incremental	  changes	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  thus	  far,	  a	  
comparative	  look	  at	  the	  chapters	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  some	  important	  differences.	  In	  particular,	  under	  the	  
rubric	  of	  incremental	  changes,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  distinguish	  between	  areas	  in	  which	  change	  has	  been	  
characterised	  by	  cautiousness	  and	  timid	  advances	  from	  areas	  in	  which	  change	  has	  been	  symbolic	  at	  best,	  
offering	  little	  scope	  for	  further	  reform	  or	  change	  in	  practices	  at	  a	  later	  date.2	  	  
The	  changes	  in	  offshore	  and	  shadow	  banking	  regulation,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  in	  accounting	  standards	  fit	  with	  
this	  symbolic	  image	  quite	  well.	  In	  Rixen’s	  chapter,	  for	  instance,	  policymakers	  (change	  agents)	  tried	  to	  
square	  the	  circle	  between	  jurisdictional	  competition	  and	  financial	  interest	  capture	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  
public	  demands	  for	  stricter	  regulation	  on	  the	  other	  by	  resorting	  to	  incremental,	  but	  often	  ineffective	  and	  
symbolic,	  reform	  measures.	  But	  policy	  makers	  are	  not	  alone	  in	  pursuing	  symbolic	  adjustments.	  Private	  
sector	  actors	  also	  moved	  in	  this	  direction	  in	  order	  to	  manage	  or	  control	  the	  process	  of	  regulatory	  change.	  In	  
line	  with	  one	  of	  the	  key	  findings	  of	  HI,	  actors	  that	  stood	  to	  lose	  from	  more	  rapid	  intervention	  intervened	  to	  
‘manage	  change’,	  control	  it.	  So,	  as	  Botzem	  shows,	  the	  IASB’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis	  can	  be	  
interpreted	  as	  a	  strategic	  response	  combining	  the	  avoidance	  of	  confrontation,	  reframing	  criticism	  and	  
carefully	  renewing	  organisational	  leadership.	  	  
Symbolic	  change	  can	  also	  be	  the	  result	  when	  different	  dynamics	  are	  at	  play.	  As	  Kjar	  shows	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
reform	  of	  mortgage	  services	  industry,	  the	  domestic	  setting	  can	  make	  veto	  players	  of	  the	  constituency	  of	  
homeowners	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Denmark	  and	  render	  change	  insignificant	  and	  merely	  symbolic	  also.	  In	  Kjar’s	  
case,	  the	  existence	  of	  ‘economic	  patriots’	  who	  are	  reluctant	  to	  see	  changes	  in	  their	  domestic	  housing	  
systems	  is	  aligned	  with	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  mortgage	  industry	  for	  modest	  change.	  	  	  
As	  this	  overview	  of	  the	  changes	  mapped	  in	  the	  book	  reveals,	  one	  of	  the	  dominant	  features	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  
financial	  regulatory	  process	  is	  the	  gap	  between	  what	  could	  have	  been	  possible	  and	  what	  actually	  took	  
place:	  on	  the	  whole,	  political	  actors	  settled	  around	  adjustments	  in	  existing	  policy	  settings	  and	  instruments.	  
In	  some	  cases,	  political	  actors	  even	  masqueraded	  minor	  action	  under	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  change.	  As	  such,	  
though	  the	  authors	  in	  this	  volume	  do	  not	  automatically	  subscribe	  to	  a	  historical	  institutionalist	  approach,	  
their	  findings	  directly	  speak	  to	  that	  research	  tradition.	  In	  particular,	  the	  contributions	  unveil	  the	  many	  ways	  
in	  which	  change	  materializes	  without	  disruption	  through	  different	  types	  of	  incremental	  dynamics	  (Streek	  
and	  Thelen	  2005).3	  So,	  what	  explains	  this	  big	  gap	  between	  possibility	  and	  action?	  What	  accounts	  for	  the	  
emergence	  of	  different	  types	  of	  incremental	  change?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	   Symbolic	   change	   is	   akin	   to	   the	   ‘hypocrisy’	   that	  many	   international	   bureacrucies	   display	   when	   they	   face	   external	  
pressures	  for	  change	  that	  are	  not	  in	  line	  with	  dominant	  internal	  culture	  and	  preferences.	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  
such	  hypocrisy,	  see	  in	  particular	  Weaver	  (2008).	  
3	  For	  an	  analysis	  of	  different	  incremental	  changes	  and	  the	  disctinction	  between	  change	  patterns	  that	  can	  be	  
characterised	  as	  layering	  and	  those	  that	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  conversion	  see	  in	  particular	  Mahoney	  and	  Thelen	  
(2010)	  and	  Streeck	  and	  Thelen	  (2005).	  For	  an	  application	  of	  these	  concepts	  to	  the	  patterns	  of	  change	  at	  the	  
	  Not	  punctuated,	  nor	  paradigmatic:	  accounting	  for	  incremental	  change	  	  
In	  this	  volume,	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  prevalence	  of	  incremental	  change,	  ,	  we	  suggested	  investigating	  the	  
interaction	  between	  evolving	  institutional	  frameworks	  and	  the	  microlevel,	  agent-­‐driven	  processes	  that	  
create	  incentives	  for	  changing	  (or	  reproducing)	  existing	  financial	  rules.	  The	  contributing	  authors	  followed	  
this	  thread	  in	  their	  empirical	  analyses.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  brought	  to	  the	  surface	  how	  the	  institutional	  and	  
normative	  features	  that	  global	  financial	  governance	  has	  acquired	  over	  time	  interacted	  with	  the	  agency	  of	  
different	  political	  actors.	  This	  interaction	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  type	  of	  change	  that	  was	  more	  constrained	  than	  the	  
type	  of	  change	  which	  would	  have	  been	  plausible	  to	  expect	  from	  a	  passing	  look	  at	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  
environment.	  In	  what	  follows,	  we	  thus	  review	  and	  examine	  the	  institutional	  and	  normative	  features	  that	  
channeled	  change	  into	  an	  incremental	  direction	  as	  well	  as	  the	  political	  actors	  that	  set	  in	  motion	  the	  process	  
of	  change	  and	  shaped	  it	  along	  the	  way.	  While	  we	  focus	  on	  each	  dimension	  separately	  for	  analytical	  
purposes,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  they	  are	  flip	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin:	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  incremental	  
dynamics	  cannot	  be	  successfully	  explained	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  one	  without	  the	  other.	  
In	  the	  first	  place,	  we	  find	  that	  specific	  institutional	  features	  pushed	  the	  reform	  process	  onto	  an	  incremental	  
direction.	  The	  findings	  of	  the	  chapters	  lend	  support	  to	  the	  propositions	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Introduction	  in	  that	  
the	  relevant	  institutional	  constraints	  to	  major,	  quick	  change	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  different	  levels	  of	  
analysis	  –	  intergovernmental,	  domestic	  and	  transnational	  level.	  The	  common	  denominator	  here	  is	  that	  the	  
relevant	  institutional	  constraints	  were	  the	  result	  of	  long-­‐term	  processes	  in	  global	  financial	  governance.	  The	  
distribution	  of	  power	  among	  states,	  with	  no	  one	  state	  in	  an	  overly	  dominant	  institutional	  position,	  
domestic	  vested	  interests	  and	  national	  economic	  structures,	  the	  density	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  sites	  of	  
authority	  in	  global	  financial	  governance	  and	  the	  embeddedness	  of	  specific	  policy	  ideas	  on	  how	  to	  govern	  
financial	  markets	  were	  all	  factors	  that	  were	  the	  result	  of	  institutional	  legacies	  of	  long-­‐term	  political	  battles	  
and	  previous	  rounds	  of	  reforms.	  In	  other	  words,	  temporality	  is	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  why	  the	  specific	  
institutional	  features	  took	  the	  shape	  they	  did	  when	  the	  financial	  crisis	  burst.	  	  These	  institutional	  features	  
dampened	  the	  push	  for	  reform	  following	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  crisis.	  
At	  the	  intergovernmental	  level,	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  institutional	  factors	  are	  most	  clear	  when	  looking	  at	  
the	  cleavages	  among	  the	  states	  involved	  in	  the	  negotiations	  on	  regulatory	  reform	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  or	  in	  
terms	  of	  overhauling	  offshore	  and	  	  shadow	  banking	  governance	  arrangements	  .	  With	  no	  clear	  leaders	  or	  
too	  diffuse	  state	  power,	  ambitious	  reform	  proposals	  were	  watered	  down.	  Indeed,	  regulatory	  change	  was	  
possible	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  did	  not	  produce	  rules	  that	  significantly	  depart	  from	  those	  in	  place	  in	  the	  
few,	  dominant	  financial	  markets.	  Quaglia’s	  empirical	  case	  shows	  that	  pre-­‐crisis	  ‘market	  making’	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
international	  level,	  see	  Moschella	  and	  Vetterlein	  (forthcoming).	  
‘market	  shaping’	  coalitions	  endured	  and	  were	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  post-­‐crisis	  reform	  compromises	  and	  
consensus	  (similar	  dynamics	  within	  the	  EU	  are	  also	  at	  play	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  Carstensen	  this	  volume).	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  Rixen	  provides	  an	  account	  where	  there	  was	  ultimately	  a	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  clear	  action	  
when	  it	  came	  to	  offshore	  and	  shadow	  banking	  regulation	  among	  the	  main	  state	  actors	  in	  financial	  
governance	  which	  were	  unable	  to	  overcome	  issues	  of	  jurisdictional	  competition.	  	  
Domestic	  factors	  are	  also	  relevant	  in	  explaining	  the	  prevailing	  pattern	  of	  incremental	  change.	  Interest	  
group	  lobbying	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  domestic	  economies	  have	  been	  of	  particular	  importance.	  Indeed,	  in	  
line	  with	  our	  theoretical	  expectations,	  the	  political	  actors	  that	  stood	  to	  lose	  from	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  
regulatory	  process	  took	  action	  to	  preserve	  their	  interests	  and	  the	  investments	  made	  in	  existing	  regulatory	  
designs.	  This	  is	  exactly	  the	  case	  of	  the	  financial	  industry.	  Pagliari	  and	  Young’s	  chapter	  clearly	  shows	  how	  the	  
domestic	  financial	  industry	  in	  the	  United	  States	  influenced	  the	  pattern	  of	  regulatory	  reform	  of	  derivatives.	  
It	  also	  explains,	  however,	  that	  this	  influence	  was	  conditional	  on	  the	  industry’s	  capacity	  to	  adjust	  its	  
advocacy	  strategies	  in	  response	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  regulatory	  environment	  triggered	  by	  the	  crisis.	  In	  
particular,	  financial	  institutions	  aligned	  their	  interests	  and	  preferences	  to	  those	  of	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  
corporate	  stakeholders,	  moving	  the	  focus	  away	  from	  calls	  to	  ‘punish	  the	  financial	  sector’	  and	  emphasising	  
the	  importance	  of	  not	  harming	  Corporate	  America	  instead..	  It	  was	  exactly	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  corporate	  
end-­‐users	  of	  financial	  products,	  and	  in	  this	  case,	  especially	  derivatives,	  that	  helped	  the	  financial	  industry	  to	  
slow	  down	  more	  ambitious	  reforms	  in	  this	  area.	  In	  this	  instance,	  therefore,	  we	  have	  a	  case	  of	  vested	  
interests	  maintaining	  their	  privileged	  position	  and	  weakening	  regulatory	  reforms.	  	  
Domestic	  considerations	  were	  also	  a	  key	  determinant	  of	  the	  incremental	  pattern	  of	  change	  for	  a	  number	  of	  
regulatory	  reforms	  debated	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  where	  the	  variety	  of	  domestic	  financial	  systems	  
mattered.	  In	  particular,	  whether	  a	  system	  is	  more	  market-­‐based	  or	  bank-­‐based	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  
regulatory	  process	  affecting	  both	  preferences	  and	  coalitions	  at	  the	  international	  level.	  This	  is	  evident,	  for	  
instance,	  in	  the	  division	  between	  the	  US	  and	  UK,	  on	  the	  one	  had,	  and	  continental	  EU	  countries	  in	  the	  
negotiations	  on	  Basel	  III	  first,	  and	  the	  CRD	  IV	  later.	  Reflecting	  the	  organisation	  of	  their	  domestic	  markets,	  
continental	  EU	  countries	  acted	  to	  defend	  the	  specific	  structure	  of	  national	  financial	  markets	  arguing	  that	  
‘traditional’	  (continental)	  banks	  engaged	  in	  less	  risky	  trade	  finance/financial	  activities.	  They	  thus	  opposed	  
the	  leverage	  ratio,	  asked	  for	  a	  modification	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  liquidity	  rules	  and	  wanted	  a	  longer	  
transition	  period	  (Quaglia	  in	  this	  volume,	  also	  Howarth	  and	  Quaglia	  2013).	  Elsewhere,	  we	  observe	  
seemingly	  different	  systems	  such	  as	  those	  of	  the	  US	  and	  Denmark	  exhibiting	  similar	  resilience	  in	  keeping	  
their	  housing	  finance	  systems	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  mortgage	  providers	  in	  particular	  relatively	  unchanged	  
(Kjar	  in	  this	  volume).	  	  
Among	  the	  domestic	  factors	  that	  pushed	  the	  regulatory	  reform	  process	  onto	  an	  incremental	  direction,	  
capacity	  problems	  in	  domestic	  administration	  were	  also	  important	  as	  Baker’s	  chapter	  reveals.	  In	  this	  case,	  
the	  translation	  of	  macroprudential	  concepts	  into	  operational	  practices	  has	  been	  slowed	  down	  by	  lack	  of	  
data	  and	  the	  need	  for	  a	  period	  of	  experimentation	  and	  trials.	  Anticipating	  future	  implementation	  problems,	  
regulators	  converged	  on	  more	  incremental	  measures	  while	  keeping	  a	  long-­‐term	  macroprudential	  agenda	  
alive.	  	  
Other	  factors	  that	  help	  explain	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  incremental	  dynamics	  can	  be	  found	  at	  the	  transnational	  level	  
and,	  in	  particular,	  in	  the	  specific	  institutional	  configuration	  that	  global	  financial	  governance	  has	  acquired	  
over	  time.	  Echoing	  historical	  institutionalist	  insights	  on	  institutional	  density	  and	  complementarity	  as	  
discussed	  in	  the	  Introduction	  to	  this	  volume,	  a	  number	  of	  case	  studies	  show	  that	  the	  institutional	  
landscape,	  which	  consists	  of	  several	  club-­‐like	  and	  expert-­‐driven	  institutions	  (see	  also	  Tsingou	  2012),	  creates	  
positive	  feedback	  effects	  and	  increasing	  returns	  for	  the	  political	  actors	  that	  operate	  in	  such	  a	  fragmented	  
landscape	  (Rixen	  this	  volume).	  Under	  these	  conditions,	  the	  incentives	  for	  radical	  change	  are	  limited	  at	  best	  
and	  may	  be	  driven	  mostly	  by	  concerns	  for	  efficiency	  (Carstensen	  this	  volume).	  Indeed,	  actors	  that	  enjoy	  the	  
positive	  returns	  from	  existing	  institutional	  designs	  are	  more	  inclined	  to	  adopt	  only	  those	  rules	  that	  are	  
compatible	  with	  existing	  ones.	  The	  incremental	  dynamics	  in	  accounting	  regulation	  are	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  As	  
Botzem’s	  chapter	  shows,	  the	  IASB’s	  institutional	  configuration,	  which	  values	  expertise	  and	  favours	  isolation	  
from	  public	  pressures,	  was	  the	  most	  powerful	  obstacle	  to	  a	  profound	  post-­‐crisis	  overhaul.	  Since	  the	  
organisation	  is	  able	  to	  define	  what	  counts	  as	  expertise	  and	  exercise	  social	  closure,	  the	  only	  change	  that	  can	  
materialise	  –	  and	  the	  one	  that	  actually	  materialised	  after	  the	  crisis	  –	  is	  a	  limited,	  and	  highly-­‐controlled	  type	  
of	  change.	  Indeed,	  this	  dynamic	  ensures	  that	  change	  does	  not	  call	  into	  the	  question	  the	  functioning	  and	  
expert	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  institution..	  
Another	  key	  factor	  that	  can	  help	  account	  for	  the	  substantial	  continuity	  in	  global	  regulation	  can	  be	  traced	  
back	  to	  the	  normative	  framework.	  Baker’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  inclusion	  of	  macroprudential	  (MPR)	  ideas	  in	  the	  
reform	  process	  shows	  that	  while	  the	  inclusion	  of	  these	  ideas	  as	  policy	  itself	  is	  new,	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  
first,	  that	  these	  ideas	  were	  theorised	  and	  debated	  (albeit	  in	  small	  circles)	  prior	  to	  the	  crisis	  and	  that	  
adoption	  is	  gradual	  and	  is	  happening	  in	  parallel	  with	  adjustments	  to	  existing	  microprudential	  principles.	  As	  
such,	  MPR	  is	  ‘new’	  thinking	  that	  does	  not,	  even	  in	  ideational	  terms,	  fully	  replace	  ‘old’	  thinking.	  In	  a	  different	  
case,	  Carstensen,	  examining	  the	  development	  of	  resolution	  regimes	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  crisis,	  points	  to	  
the	  contradictions	  between	  ideational	  consensus	  in	  principle	  but	  the	  difficulty	  of	  reconciling	  ideas	  of	  
‘universality’	  and	  ‘territoriality’	  in	  practice.	  
Although	  the	  institutional	  and	  normative	  characteristics	  summarised	  thus	  far	  are	  certainly	  key	  factors	  in	  
explaining	  the	  incrementalism	  in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  reform	  process,	  the	  role	  of	  actors	  engaged	  in	  the	  reform	  
process	  as	  change	  agents	  and	  veto	  players	  needs	  to	  be	  further	  	  investigated.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  in	  order	  to	  
explain	  change,	  we	  should	  also	  focus	  on	  ‘the	  microlevel	  processes	  that	  create	  incentives	  for	  individuals	  to	  
reproduce	  (or	  not)	  designs	  during	  and	  after	  [critical	  historical]	  junctures’	  (Fioretos	  2011:	  375-­‐76).	  Also,	  we	  
should	  recognise	  the	  dynamic	  relationship	  between	  structures	  and	  agency	  without	  privileging	  one	  over	  the	  
other.	  Botzem	  puts	  it	  well	  in	  this	  volume	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  IASB,	  noting	  that	  simply	  referring	  to	  the	  
institutional	  characteristics	  of	  the	  IASB	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  organisation	  reacted	  to	  the	  crisis.	  
A	  thorough	  explanation	  of	  change	  instead	  requires	  focusing	  on	  how	  powerful	  actors	  inside	  the	  IASB	  
organised,	  mediated	  and	  actively	  managed	  change.	  
Building	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  combining	  an	  agent-­‐centered	  approach	  with	  the	  more	  traditional	  insights	  of	  
historical	  institutionalism,	  all	  chapters	  take	  as	  a	  starting	  a	  point	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  key	  actors	  that	  
support/advocate	  (change	  actors)	  and	  oppose	  change	  (veto	  players)	  within	  the	  distinct	  constraints	  and	  
opportunities	  provided	  by	  the	  institutional	  environment	  in	  which	  they	  operate.	  In	  this	  context,	  actors’	  
motivations	  and,	  more	  importantly	  to	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  actors’	  reform	  strategies	  are	  endogenous	  
to	  the	  distinct	  institutional	  context.	  
The	  findings	  of	  the	  empirical	  chapters	  reveal	  that	  the	  key	  political	  actors	  that	  support	  or	  oppose	  change	  
include	  both	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  officials	  and	  private	  sector	  representatives.	  Furthermore,	  in	  line	  
with	  our	  theoretical	  expectations,	  the	  identity	  of	  change	  agents	  and	  veto	  players	  cannot	  be	  anticipated	  ex	  
ante	  because	  it	  is	  not	  fixed.	  The	  same	  actor	  can	  play	  the	  role	  of	  change	  agent	  and	  veto	  player	  according	  to	  
the	  institutional	  context	  in	  which	  they	  operate.	  For	  instance,	  government	  actors	  sometimes	  acted	  as	  
change	  agents	  for	  certain	  reforms	  and	  as	  veto	  players	  in	  others.	  This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  chapter	  
on	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  EU	  regulation	  (Quaglia	  this	  volume).	  Whereas	  the	  main	  political	  cleavage	  was	  between	  
the	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  countries	  and	  the	  Continental	  EU	  countries	  in	  the	  case	  of	  banking	  regulation,	  with	  the	  
former	  acting	  as	  change	  agents	  and	  the	  latter	  as	  veto	  players,	  these	  roles	  were	  less	  stable	  as	  the	  regulatory	  
process	  moved	  to	  other	  financial	  sectors.	  Quaglia	  shows	  that	  instead,	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	  
credit	  rating	  agencies	  and	  hedge	  funds	  in	  Europe,	  France	  and	  Germany	  were	  the	  main	  sponsors	  of	  the	  new	  
rules,	  hence	  acting	  as	  agents	  of	  change,	  with	  the	  UK	  and	  some	  nordic	  countries	  such	  as	  Sweden	  and	  Finland	  
performing	  veto	  player	  roles.	  The	  importance	  of	  differentiating	  between	  types	  of	  public	  actors	  and	  their	  
potential	  roles	  in	  pushing	  or	  stalling	  reform	  also	  comes	  through	  in	  the	  empirical	  cases,	  most	  notably	  in	  
Carstensen’s	  analysis	  of	  post-­‐crisis	  bank	  resolution	  regimes.	  Carstensen	  shows	  that	  while	  there	  has	  been	  
much	  change	  agent	  activity	  from	  the	  European	  Commission	  on	  cross-­‐border	  resolution	  thinking	  and	  policy,	  
national	  authorities	  are	  more	  reluctant	  to	  push	  through	  ambitious	  implementation	  of	  these	  ideas	  
(Carstensen	  this	  volume).	  	  
The	  private	  sector	  too	  has	  acted	  both	  as	  change	  agent	  and	  veto	  player	  according	  to	  the	  sector	  or	  issue	  area	  
under	  regulation.	  In	  Carstensen’s	  analysis,	  for	  instance,	  the	  private	  sector	  as	  represented	  by	  the	  Institute	  of	  
International	  Finance	  is	  a	  clear	  change	  agent	  in	  promoting	  internationalisation	  of	  the	  regime.	  Elsewhere,	  
however,	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  financial	  industry	  follow	  veto	  player	  characteristics.	  This	  is	  notable	  in	  the	  
example	  of	  derivatives	  regulation	  in	  the	  US	  (Pagliari	  and	  Young	  this	  volume)	  and	  mortgage	  providers	  in	  the	  
US	  and	  Denmark	  (Kjar	  this	  volume)	  but	  also	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  accounting	  standards,	  where	  the	  IASB	  
strategically	  defined	  rules	  for	  ‘normal’	  times	  (Botzem	  this	  volume).	  As	  such,	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  empirical	  
cases	  warn	  us	  to	  keep	  an	  open	  mind	  about	  who	  wants	  change	  and	  in	  whose	  interests	  it	  is	  to	  stall	  it	  and	  to	  
recognise	  the	  issue-­‐specific	  dynamics	  and	  different	  tactics	  and	  motivations	  at	  play.	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  our	  study,	  like	  most	  HI,	  places	  significant	  attention	  on	  historical	  contextualisation	  and	  
temporality,	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  timing	  and	  sequence	  of	  events	  shape	  political	  trajectories	  by	  conditioning	  
the	  interests	  of	  and	  options	  available	  to	  actors	  in	  contemporary	  reform	  processes	  (Pierson	  2000a,	  2004).	  At	  
the	  same	  time,	  however,	  we	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  careful	  examination	  of	  agency	  within	  the	  
institutional	  constraints	  and	  opportunities	  that	  political	  actors	  face	  in	  their	  activity.	  Despite	  some	  
expectations	  for	  bigger	  and	  speedier	  changes,	  the	  activity,	  motivations	  and	  strategies	  of	  change	  actors	  and	  
veto	  players	  has	  been	  heavily	  informed	  by	  the	  deep-­‐seated	  institutional	  characteristics	  that	  global	  financial	  
governance	  has	  acquired	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  entrapping	  change	  into	  an	  incremental	  dynamic.	  
	  
3.	  Incrementalism	  as	  a	  regime-­‐preserving	  strategy?	  Unpredictability	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  
politics	  of	  financial	  reforms	  	  
	  
To	  summarise	  the	  main	  message	  of	  this	  book,	  which	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  solid	  empirical	  findings	  reviewed	  
above,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  crisis	  created	  the	  perceived	  conditions	  for	  quick,	  paradigmatic	  
change	  in	  how	  global	  finance	  is	  governed.	  All	  the	  textbook	  factors	  for	  such	  change	  were	  indeed	  in	  place:	  
from	  the	  large-­‐scale	  implications	  of	  regulatory	  failures	  to	  the	  politicisation	  of	  previously	  technical	  issues	  
and	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  policy-­‐making	  context.	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  window	  of	  opportunity,	  however,	  global	  
financial	  governance	  has	  been	  largely	  fixed	  at	  the	  margin	  via	  small,	  incremental	  changes	  in	  key	  regulatory	  
areas.	  In	  short,	  the	  great	  expectations	  for	  change	  have	  been	  largely	  disappointed.	  The	  distinct	  institutional	  
characteristics	  of	  global	  financial	  governance	  reduced	  the	  room	  of	  manoeuvre	  for	  the	  political	  actors	  
pushing	  for	  change	  and	  even	  foreclose	  what	  they	  could	  think	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  regulatory	  reforms.	  The	  same	  
institutional	  features	  that	  global	  financial	  governance	  has	  acquired	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  played	  into	  
the	  hands	  of	  veto	  players	  transforming	  them	  into	  de	  facto	  change	  agents	  that	  managed	  the	  pace	  and	  
content	  of	  the	  regulatory	  reform	  process.	  Cautious	  advances	  and	  regulatory	  gaps	  have	  thus	  been	  the	  
ultimate	  result	  –	  a	  situation	  that	  is	  miles	  away	  from	  a	  profound	  rethink	  and	  restructuring	  of	  how	  global	  
finance	  is	  regulated.	  
Given	  the	  current	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  financial	  regulation	  several	  years	  since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  crisis,	  we	  can	  
raise	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  incremental	  policy-­‐making	  mode	  that	  we	  unveiled	  in	  this	  book	  adds	  up	  to	  
little	  more	  than	  a	  regime-­‐preserving	  strategy.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  conclude	  from	  our	  analysis	  
that	  the	  process	  of	  change	  has	  altered	  something	  just	  to	  ensure	  that	  things	  stay	  as	  they	  were	  before	  the	  
crisis?	  Is	  incrementalism	  just	  a	  cover	  for	  conservative	  forces,	  both	  among	  change	  agents	  and	  veto	  players,	  
to	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo?	  And	  does	  that	  mean	  that	  the	  long-­‐term	  consequences	  of	  this	  round	  of	  reform	  
will	  be	  negligible	  for	  the	  future	  of	  global	  financial	  governance?	  
The	  most	  immediate	  –	  but	  inaccurate	  –	  reading	  of	  our	  findings	  suggests	  a	  positive	  answer	  to	  these	  
questions.	  Indeed,	  as	  the	  findings	  have	  shown,	  more	  often	  than	  not	  the	  regulatory	  reform	  process	  has	  
accommodated	  the	  requests	  of	  those	  political	  actors	  that	  wanted	  to	  preserve	  (and	  not	  change)	  the	  existing	  
financial	  regime.	  By	  building	  a	  coalition	  with	  corporate	  end-­‐users,	  the	  financial	  industry	  succeeded	  in	  
containing	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  derivatives	  market	  –	  and	  thus	  preserving	  their	  profitable	  activities	  in	  this	  
market.	  Likewise,	  change	  agents	  within	  the	  IASB	  managed	  the	  regulatory	  reform	  process	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
maintained	  the	  primacy	  of	  professional,	  private	  expertise	  in	  setting	  global	  accounting	  rules.	  The	  
incrementalism	  of	  banking	  reforms,	  including	  those	  of	  the	  shadow	  banking	  sector,	  was	  strongly	  supported	  
by	  those	  governments	  that	  wanted	  to	  preserve	  the	  competitive	  advantage	  of	  their	  domestic	  financial	  
industry.	  A	  regime-­‐preserving	  orientation	  can	  also	  be	  detected	  among	  the	  most	  outspoken	  change	  agents:	  
for	  instance,	  while	  BIS	  and	  other	  prominent	  economists	  forcefully	  advocated	  the	  adoption	  of	  MPR,	  the	  
debate	  has	  evolved	  in	  a	  way	  that	  preserves	  the	  centrality	  of	  unelected	  technocrats	  in	  shaping	  the	  rules	  for	  
financial	  markets.	  
Although	  these	  findings	  clearly	  show	  that	  long-­‐term	  trends,	  entrenched	  positions	  and	  crystallised	  power	  
constellations	  in	  global	  financial	  governance	  severely	  constrained	  the	  politics	  of	  post-­‐crisis	  reform,	  we	  
argue	  that	  the	  incremental	  dynamics	  of	  change	  that	  have	  been	  analysed	  in	  this	  volume	  cannot	  easily	  be	  
dismissed	  as	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  example	  of	  regime-­‐preservation.	  This	  argument	  rests	  on	  both	  empirical	  
and	  theoretical	  observations.	  	  
At	  the	  empirical	  level,	  several	  findings	  indicate	  that	  the	  incremental	  dynamics	  that	  characterised	  the	  post-­‐
crisis	  regulatory	  reform	  are	  not	  solely	  a	  strategy	  for	  preserving	  the	  status	  quo	  but	  also	  a	  necessary	  strategy	  
for	  altering	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  entrenching	  change.	  For	  instance,	  in	  case	  of	  macroprudential	  regulation,	  
economists	  in	  key	  international	  regulatory	  agencies	  deliberately	  decided	  to	  embark	  on	  a	  slow-­‐moving	  
experimentation	  of	  the	  new	  regulatory	  ideas	  in	  order	  to	  collect	  the	  necessary	  evidence	  to	  both	  win	  the	  
policy	  debate	  among	  technocrats	  and	  gather	  support	  from	  political	  leaders	  and	  the	  wider	  public.	  The	  same	  
financial	  industry	  did	  not	  overly	  oppose	  some	  key	  regulatory	  proposals	  because	  of	  their	  incremental	  
nature:	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  opposition	  of	  the	  financial	  industry	  was	  less	  decisive	  than	  in	  the	  recent	  past	  also	  
because	  the	  proposed	  reforms	  have	  postponed	  implementation	  phases	  allowing	  both	  for	  more	  time	  to	  
adapt	  to	  the	  new	  rules	  and	  to	  organise	  a	  more	  sustained	  lobbying	  effort	  in	  more	  propitious	  policy-­‐making	  
contexts.	  	  
In	  short,	  change	  agents	  settled	  on	  a	  no-­‐radical	  solution	  in	  order	  to	  win	  consensus	  or	  overcome	  institutional	  
constraints.	  Veto	  players	  also	  accepted	  –	  albeit	  grudgingly	  –	  incremental	  reforms	  because	  they	  thought	  
that	  their	  incremental	  nature	  would	  have	  pushed	  back	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  reforms	  
would	  have	  been	  felt.	  Anticipating	  time	  inconsistency	  problems,	  with	  policymakers	  reneging	  on	  their	  policy	  
decisions	  or	  rethinking	  them	  as	  a	  result	  of	  lobbying	  pressures,	  incremental	  reforms	  became	  acceptable	  
even	  to	  those	  actors	  who	  would	  have	  otherwise	  opposed	  them.	  While	  these	  incremental	  changes	  are	  a	  
‘second-­‐best	  option’	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  those	  who	  wanted	  more	  radical	  transformations,	  their	  long-­‐
terms	  effects	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated	  as	  the	  following	  theoretical	  observations	  contend.	  
Indeed,	  at	  the	  theoretical	  level,	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  the	  new	  rules	  and	  the	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  the	  
post-­‐crisis	  round	  of	  reforms	  are	  likely	  to	  undermine	  the	  regime-­‐preserving	  nature	  that	  incrementalism	  is	  
often	  accused	  of.	  To	  start	  with,	  although	  the	  current	  round	  of	  reform	  can	  be	  read	  as	  attempt	  of	  producing	  
stability	  in	  an	  unstable	  world	  by	  formalising	  risks	  and	  ambiguities	  (Best	  2005	  ;	  Blyth	  2006),	  new	  rules	  still	  
need	  to	  be	  reproduced	  in	  practice	  through	  agents	  that	  apply	  them	  to	  their	  specific	  –	  and	  changing	  –	  
situations	  (Streeck	  and	  Thelen	  2005).	  Wolfgang	  Streek	  (2011:	  664)	  summarises	  the	  logic	  behind	  the	  
processes	  of	  change	  that	  take	  place	  due	  to	  the	  ‘imperfect	  reproduction	  of	  existing	  rules’:	  
	  
‘the	  conditions	  under	  which	  social	  rules	  are	  supposed	  to	  apply	  are	  inevitably	  unique	  and	  varying	  in	  time,	  
due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  world	  is	  more	  complex	  than	  the	  principles	  we	  have	  devised	  to	  make	  it	  predictable.	  
This	  forces	  actors	  to	  apply	  rules	  creatively,	  actualizing	  and	  modifying	  them	  in	  the	  process’.	  
	  
In	  short,	  there	  is	  an	  inherent	  ambiguity	  in	  the	  rules	  that	  guide	  behaviour.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  rules	  that	  
have	  just	  been	  created	  will	  be	  in	  need	  of	  (re)interpretion,	  especially	  in	  highly	  evolving	  contexts	  as	  financial	  
markets	  are.	  Their	  reproduction	  and	  practical	  application	  are	  thus	  not	  given	  but	  subject	  to	  interpretation	  by	  
the	  relevant	  actors.	  Given	  the	  need	  for	  interpretation	  and	  reproduction,	  even	  the	  most	  ‘incremental’,	  
managed	  changes	  adopted	  thus	  far	  provide	  actors	  with	  the	  room	  of	  manoeuvre	  to	  develop	  new	  
interpretation	  about	  how	  a	  specific	  rule	  should	  work	  under	  changed	  circumstances	  or	  about	  how	  a	  specific	  
aspect	  of	  the	  world	  economy	  should	  be	  (re)interpreted.	  As	  Mahoney	  and	  Thelen	  (2010:	  11)	  put	  it,	  ‘actors	  
with	  divergent	  interests	  will	  contest	  the	  openings	  this	  ambiguity	  provides	  because	  matters	  of	  interpretation	  
and	  implementation	  can	  have	  profound	  consequences	  for	  resource	  allocations	  and	  substantive	  outcomes.’	  
This,	  in	  turn,	  can	  bring	  about	  a	  more	  profound	  type	  of	  change	  than	  the	  one	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  envisage	  
from	  today’s	  perspective.	  	  
Next	  to	  the	  ambiguity	  inherent	  in	  the	  new	  financial	  rules,	  another	  consideration	  that	  speaks	  against	  the	  
equation	  incrementalism	  =	  conservatism	  derives	  from	  the	  application	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  unintended	  
consequences.	  Indeed,	  as	  HI	  scholarship	  has	  long	  demonstrated,	  change	  cannot	  be	  conceived	  as	  a	  
dichotomous	  variable	  but	  it	  is	  better	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  continuous	  interaction	  between	  continuity	  and	  
change	  (Thelen	  1999).	  It	  is	  this	  blend	  of	  elements	  of	  continuity	  and	  change	  that	  allows	  for	  unexpected	  
consequences	  to	  arise.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  once	  some	  elements	  of	  change	  are	  brought	  into	  well-­‐defined	  
institutional	  designs,	  their	  consequences	  are	  not	  easy	  to	  anticipate.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  not	  uncommon	  that	  
rapid	  and	  substantive	  policy	  shifts	  are	  triggered	  by	  the	  slow,	  cumulative	  effects	  of	  previous	  policy	  changes	  
(Haydu	  1998;	  Howlett	  2009;	  Kay	  2007).	  	  	  
This	  is	  exactly	  the	  case	  that	  may	  materialise	  in	  the	  area	  of	  global	  financial	  governance.	  Although	  the	  
reforms	  that	  have	  been	  adopted	  thus	  far	  are	  based	  on	  small,	  slow	  adjustments	  to	  existing	  rules	  and	  
institutions,	  these	  apparently	  insignificant	  changes	  can	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  bigger	  ones	  tomorrow.	  It	  is	  already	  
possible	  to	  speculate	  on	  some	  developments	  that	  may	  bring	  about	  these	  big,	  unintended	  consequences.	  	  
For	  instance,	  the	  unintended	  effects	  of	  the	  rules	  adopted	  today	  may	  spring	  from	  the	  wrong	  incentive	  and	  
negative	  spillover	  effects.	  Banking	  regulation	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  prime	  example	  here.	  Indeed,	  one	  of	  the	  
immediate	  threats	  is	  that	  of	  regulatory	  arbitrage,	  as	  stricter	  rules	  imposed	  on	  banks	  via	  Basel	  III	  set	  
incentives	  for	  activities	  and	  risks	  to	  be	  pushed	  from	  the	  core	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  outward	  to	  the	  
nonbank	  financial	  sector,	  where	  the	  new	  rules	  do	  not	  apply.	  As	  already	  noted,	  then,	  there	  is	  mounting	  
evidence	  that	  innovative	  products	  are	  already	  being	  developed	  to	  circumvent	  some	  new	  regulations	  (IMF	  
2012).	  In	  short,	  today’s	  regulation	  may	  create	  the	  conditions	  for	  increased	  risks	  tomorrow.	  As	  these	  risks	  
become	  clear	  –	  or	  lead	  to	  a	  new	  crisis	  –	  the	  case	  for	  more	  stringent	  regulation	  in	  today’s	  overlooked	  
markets	  will	  become	  a	  pressing	  concern.	  
A	  similar	  pattern	  towards	  more	  decisive	  regulation	  than	  it	  is	  currently	  the	  case	  may	  be	  triggered	  by	  the	  lack	  
of	  regulation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  there	  are	  financial	  markets	  and	  products	  whose	  regulation	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  
discussed	  or	  entered	  the	  radar	  screen	  of	  regulators	  and	  policy	  makers.	  This	  challenge	  is	  not	  new	  to	  scholars	  
of	  financial	  regulation:	  financial	  regulation	  –	  as	  most	  other	  forms	  of	  regulation	  –	  is	  usually	  reactive,	  
rearward-­‐looking.	  Like	  the	  generals	  that	  keep	  on	  fighting	  the	  last	  war,	  after	  a	  crisis	  starts,	  policy	  makers	  and	  
regulators	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  regulate	  the	  areas	  that	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  at	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  crisis.	  
However,	  given	  the	  speed	  of	  financial	  innovation	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  financial	  interconnectedness,	  it	  is	  likely	  
that	  today’s	  reforms	  (and	  lack	  thereof)	  won’t	  stand	  up	  to	  the	  test	  of	  the	  next	  crisis,	  triggering	  a	  new	  round	  
of	  regulatory	  reform.	  Although	  the	  regulatory	  actions	  that	  have	  been	  adopted	  so	  far	  are	  largely	  
incremental,	  they	  have	  nonetheless	  set	  in	  motion	  a	  dynamic	  of	  change	  that	  is	  largely	  unpredictable	  
especially	  in	  light	  of	  the	  evolving	  conditions	  in	  financial	  markets.	  This	  situation	  does	  not	  ensure	  that	  
political	  actors	  will	  totally	  control	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  regulatory	  reform	  process.	  
This	  unpredictability	  is	  further	  discernible	  from	  the	  new	  alliances	  that	  have	  been	  built	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  
crisis.	  In	  particular,	  the	  financial	  industry-­‐corporate	  coalition	  is	  more	  unstable	  that	  the	  coalition	  made	  up	  
solely	  of	  financial	  firms	  that	  dominated	  the	  reform	  process	  since	  the	  late	  1990s.	  Although	  the	  two	  groups’	  
interests	  converged	  around	  the	  need	  to	  mitigate	  the	  effects	  of	  too	  stringent	  regulation	  of	  derivative	  
markets	  and	  products,	  the	  foundations	  upon	  which	  this	  alliance	  is	  based	  are	  shaky	  at	  best.	  The	  two	  groups	  
represent	  constituencies	  with	  dramatically	  divergent	  preferences	  that	  reflect	  the	  different	  distributional	  
implications	  of	  cross-­‐border	  capital	  flows	  (Frieden	  1991;	  Goodman	  and	  Pauly	  1993).	  Furthermore,	  the	  
presumed	  conservative	  character	  of	  current	  incremental	  reforms	  is	  also	  called	  into	  question	  by	  the	  growing	  
divergences	  within	  the	  financial	  industry.	  Rather	  than	  being	  a	  monolithic	  group,	  the	  crisis	  has	  exposed	  
severe	  fault	  lines	  among	  financial	  industries	  (Helleiner	  and	  Pagliari	  2011:	  184).	  As	  a	  result,	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  
incremental	  nature,	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  regulatory	  reform	  process	  does	  not	  guarantee	  a	  ‘lock-­‐in’	  effect	  based	  on	  
the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  its	  privileges.	  
Based	  on	  the	  above	  observations,	  it	  would	  be	  premature,	  we	  submit,	  to	  dismiss	  the	  result	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  
regulatory	  reform	  out	  of	  hand.	  Under	  the	  dominant	  incremental	  dynamics	  highlighted	  in	  our	  case	  studies,	  
there	  are	  important	  elements	  of	  novelty	  that	  may,	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  bring	  about	  a	  more	  profound	  overhaul	  
of	  the	  way	  global	  finance	  is	  governed.	  This	  conclusion	  is	  not	  dictated	  by	  some	  sort	  of	  ‘optimism’	  towards	  
the	  reform	  process.	  It	  is	  based	  on	  a	  careful	  analysis	  of	  empirical	  findings	  and	  theoretical	  insights.	  
So,	  in	  our	  view,	  the	  main	  problem	  with	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  regulatory	  reform	  lies	  not	  so	  much	  in	  the	  presumed	  
conservatism	  associated	  with	  the	  incremental	  dynamics	  of	  change.	  More	  disturbing	  than	  the	  potential	  
conservative	  effects	  of	  incrementalism	  are	  its	  complexity	  effects.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  one	  of	  the	  major	  problems	  
of	  the	  incremental	  dynamics	  of	  post-­‐crisis	  regulatory	  reform	  lies	  in	  inducing	  the	  creation	  of	  complex	  
regulatory	  systems.	  Rather	  than	  dismantling	  and	  replacing	  old	  rules	  with	  new	  ones,	  the	  incremental	  
regulatory	  process	  has	  indeed	  proceeded	  by	  small	  adjustments,	  modifications,	  and	  rule	  expansions.	  
However,	  as	  new	  rules	  have	  been	  layered	  on	  old	  ones	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  banking	  regulation	  with	  the	  
adoption	  of	  Basel	  III,	  see	  Baker	  in	  this	  volume)	  or	  existing	  supervisory	  tools	  have	  been	  redirected	  to	  new	  
purposes	  (as	  with	  the	  emerging	  consensus	  on	  how	  to	  resolve	  distressed	  financial	  institutions,	  Carstensen	  in	  
this	  volume),	  the	  resulting	  outcome	  has	  been	  a	  complicated	  regulatory	  web	  that	  puts	  extra	  work	  on	  
regulatory	  authorities	  in	  adequately	  assessing	  risks	  in	  global	  financial	  markets	  while	  multiplying	  the	  
possibilities	  for	  private	  actors	  to	  game	  the	  same	  rules.	  
Andrew	  Haldane,	  Executive	  Director	  of	  Financial	  Stability	  at	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  has	  powerfully	  
summarised	  the	  potential	  negative	  effects	  of	  this	  layering-­‐cum-­‐complexity	  process	  by	  examining	  the	  new	  
banking	  regulation	  embodied	  in	  the	  Basel	  III	  accord.	  In	  a	  paper	  presented	  at	  Jackson	  Hole	  in	  August	  2012,	  
titled	  The	  Dog	  and	  the	  Frisbee,	  Haldane	  (2012)	  explained	  that	  dogs	  do	  not	  need	  to	  understand	  the	  physics	  
behind	  a	  frisbee’s	  trajectory	  in	  order	  to	  catch	  it.	  Similarly,	  capital	  standards	  are	  better	  when	  they	  are	  higher	  
and	  blunter	  than	  when	  they	  are	  lower	  and	  more	  sophisticated.	  Complex	  maths,	  models	  and	  risk-­‐weighting	  
that	  underpin	  current	  banking	  regulation	  are	  easier	  for	  banks	  to	  game	  than	  simple	  rules.	  	  Furthermore,	  
complex	  rules	  are	  of	  not	  help	  to	  regulators	  too.	  Haldane	  illustrates	  this	  point	  by	  comparing	  predictions	  
about	  the	  chances	  of	  failure	  for	  a	  sample	  of	  100	  global	  banks	  in	  2006,	  based	  on	  the	  simple	  ratios	  of	  
assets/equity	  with	  the	  corresponding	  complex,	  Basel	  III-­‐style	  risk-­‐weighted	  one.	  The	  simple	  metric	  wins	  
decisively	  over	  the	  more	  sophisticated	  risk-­‐weighted	  system.	  
So	  the	  major	  risk	  stemming	  out	  from	  the	  incremental	  dynamics	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  financial	  regulatory	  reform	  
is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  potential	  conservatism	  associated	  with	  the	  regime-­‐preserving	  efforts	  of	  the	  reforms	  
adopted	  thus	  far.	  But	  one	  of	  the	  most	  potentially	  damaging	  effects	  of	  the	  incremental	  patterns	  of	  reform	  is	  
the	  complexity	  it	  has	  helped	  creating:	  given	  the	  inability	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  major	  overhaul	  of	  global	  financial	  
regulation,	  change	  agents	  and	  veto	  players	  have	  created	  a	  regulatory	  system	  that	  reproduces	  and	  amplifies	  
some	  of	  the	  mistakes	  of	  the	  recent	  past.	  In	  particular,	  this	  pattern	  of	  incremental	  reproduction	  has	  
increased	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  regulatory	  environment.	  This	  could	  help	  private	  sector	  actors	  to	  escape	  the	  
rules	  that	  have	  just	  been	  created	  and	  put	  an	  excessive	  burden	  on	  public	  authorities	  who	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  
supervising	  the	  new	  system.	  	  
	  
4.	  The	  politics	  of	  global	  financial	  regulatory	  reforms:	  a	  prospective	  research	  agenda	  
	  
Several	  years	  into	  regulatory	  negotiations	  and	  reforms,	  time	  has	  come	  to	  start	  reflecting	  on	  the	  main	  
challenges	  that	  policy	  makers	  and	  regulators	  around	  the	  world	  will	  face	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  reforms	  that	  
have	  been	  adopted	  thus	  far.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  think	  of	  at	  least	  two	  main	  challenges	  –	  whose	  
investigation	  will	  be	  of	  primary	  importance	  for	  scholars	  interested	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  financial	  regulatory	  
reforms.	  These	  challenges	  pertain	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  implementation	  and	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  
advanced	  economies	  and	  emerging	  markets	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  system.	  
The	  first	  challenge	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  measures	  whose	  origins	  and	  adoption	  have	  
been	  traced	  here.	  By	  the	  time	  we	  started	  working	  on	  this	  book,	  the	  greatest	  challenge	  to	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  
reform	  process	  stemmed	  from	  coordination	  and	  cooperation	  problems	  among	  the	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  
negotiations	  –	  not	  only	  governments	  but	  also	  regulatory	  agencies	  and	  private	  sector	  actors.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  
the	  main	  problem	  was	  that	  of	  overcoming	  cognitive	  limitations,	  mutual	  distrust	  and	  conflicting	  interests	  
that	  hinder	  the	  adoption	  of	  consensus	  solutions.	  Given	  this	  overriding	  concern	  and	  considering	  that	  much	  
regulatory	  reforms	  have	  only	  recently	  been	  adopted	  or	  remain	  under	  examination,	  the	  chapters	  in	  this	  
book	  have	  analysed	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  regulatory	  reform	  by	  focusing	  solely	  on	  the	  stages	  of	  rules	  
formulation,	  negotiation,	  and	  decision.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  opted	  not	  to	  cover	  in	  our	  analysis	  the	  other	  
important	  stages	  of	  the	  regulatory	  process,	  namely	  rule	  implementation,	  monitoring,	  and	  diffusion.	  It	  is	  
important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  issues	  related	  to	  implementation	  –	  such	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  necessary	  
organisational	  capacity	  and	  networks	  to	  implement	  a	  specific	  regulatory	  reform	  –	  loom	  large	  during	  the	  
process	  of	  regulatory	  formulation,	  negotiation,	  and	  decision.	  For	  instance,	  Baker’s	  case	  study	  in	  this	  volume	  
shows	  that	  the	  political	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  macroprudential	  regulatory	  framework	  
(mainly	  economists	  from	  key	  domestic	  and	  international	  regulatory	  agencies)	  have	  been	  cautious	  in	  
pushing	  through	  the	  new	  framework	  because	  of	  the	  need	  to	  test	  new	  ideas	  and	  develop	  appropriate	  
organisational	  capacities	  in	  domestic	  agencies.	  	  
In	  short,	  thus	  far,	  we	  treated	  implementation	  problems	  as	  one	  of	  the	  independent	  variables	  that	  help	  
explain	  the	  incremental	  pattern	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  regulatory	  reform.	  When	  political	  actors	  anticipated	  
implementation	  problems,	  they	  settled	  on	  minor,	  slow-­‐moving	  regulatory	  solutions.	  However,	  
implementation	  problems	  can	  also	  be	  treated	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable	  to	  be	  studied.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  
question	  can	  be	  raised	  of	  what	  factors	  and	  conditions	  favour	  (or	  hinder)	  the	  implementation	  of	  new	  
regulations.	  And	  this	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  pressing	  issues	  that	  the	  international	  community	  is	  facing	  in	  the	  
next	  stage	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  reform	  process.	  So,	  although	  the	  empirical	  chapters	  have	  bracketed	  this	  
important	  issue,	  in	  these	  conclusions,	  we	  can	  start	  reflecting	  on	  what	  the	  major	  implementation	  problems	  
are	  and	  what	  research	  areas	  they	  open	  up.	  	  
To	  start	  with,	  implementation	  problems	  are	  likely	  to	  differ	  according	  to	  whether	  implementation	  is	  
required	  at	  the	  international	  or	  domestic	  level.	  At	  the	  international	  level,	  implementation	  will	  require	  
either	  the	  development	  of	  new	  skills	  and	  bureaucratic	  practices	  by	  the	  regulatory	  agencies	  that	  will	  have	  to	  
perform	  new	  tasks	  or	  the	  development	  of	  cooperative	  practices	  among	  international	  regulatory	  bodies.	  For	  
instance,	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  macroprudential	  framework	  requires	  regulatory	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  
BIS,	  the	  FSB	  and	  the	  IMF	  to	  develop	  common	  understandings	  of	  the	  measures	  that	  will	  make	  up	  the	  MPR	  
policy	  toolkit.	  Furthermore,	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  MPR	  ideas	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  development	  of	  
new	  methodologies	  and	  data	  to	  assess	  risks	  from	  a	  macro,	  systemic	  perspective.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  shift	  to	  
a	  systemic	  oversight	  approach	  requests	  a	  demanding	  organisational	  effort	  from	  the	  international	  bodies	  
that	  will	  undertake	  it	  –	  i.e.	  it	  requires	  these	  bodies	  to	  develop	  resources	  to	  collect	  and	  pool	  information	  on	  
a	  wide	  range	  of	  potential	  sources	  of	  financial	  risks.	  A	  systemic	  approach	  to	  financial	  surveillance	  also	  
requires	  the	  development	  and	  operationalisation	  of	  new	  standards	  against	  which	  to	  assess	  domestic	  
policies	  (on	  these	  issues	  see	  also	  Baker	  2012;	  Moschella	  2011).	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  implementation	  of	  the	  
agreed-­‐upon	  measures,	  international	  regulators	  will	  also	  need	  new	  powers.	  The	  secretary	  general	  of	  the	  
International	  Organisation	  of	  Securities	  Commission	  (IOSCO),	  David	  Wright,	  has	  already	  made	  this	  point	  
explicit	  noting	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  successful,	  the	  watchdog	  would	  need	  more	  deterrents	  at	  its	  disposal.	  In	  
his	  words,	  ‘It’s	  all	  very	  well	  setting	  up	  principles	  but	  we	  have	  to	  implement	  them	  globally.	  Our	  role	  at	  Iosco	  
will	  increase.	  Imagine	  a	  world	  where	  there	  are	  15-­‐20	  major	  financial	  markets	  with	  nobody	  at	  global	  level	  
able	  to	  enforce	  [regulation].’	  	  
Implementation	  of	  some	  of	  the	  new	  reforms	  will	  also	  require	  the	  deepening	  of	  inter-­‐institutional	  
cooperation	  among	  several	  regulatory	  bodies.	  For	  instance,	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  FSF	  into	  FSB	  has	  also	  
been	  marked	  by	  an	  increased,	  formal	  role	  of	  the	  FSB	  in	  overseeing	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  other	  standard-­‐
setting	  bodies.	  In	  particular,	  the	  FSB	  has	  been	  delegated	  the	  power	  to	  ‘undertake	  joint	  strategic	  reviews	  of	  
and	  coordinate	  the	  policy	  development	  work	  of	  the	  international	  standard	  setting	  bodies	  to	  ensure	  their	  
work	  is	  timely,	  coordinated,	  focused	  on	  priorities	  and	  addressing	  gaps’	  (FSB	  Charter,	  Article	  2).	  For	  this	  new	  
power	  to	  be	  effectively	  implemented,	  however,	  the	  FSB	  will	  need	  to	  interact	  more	  closely	  with	  the	  other	  
standard-­‐setting	  bodies	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  their	  progress.	  Similarly,	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  ‘data	  initiative’,	  which	  has	  
been	  adopted	  at	  the	  promptings	  of	  the	  G20	  Leaders	  to	  fill	  in	  data	  gaps	  on	  key	  financial	  sector	  vulnerabilities	  
relevant	  for	  financial	  stability	  analysis,	  is	  closely	  dependent	  on	  the	  collaboration	  of	  several	  international	  
bodies.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  Interagency	  Group	  on	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Statistics	  (IAG),	  which	  was	  
established	  at	  end-­‐2008	  to	  coordinate	  work	  on	  the	  improvement	  of	  economic	  and	  financial	  statistics	  
among	  international	  agencies,	  include	  the	  Bank	  for	  International	  Settlements	  (BIS),	  the	  European	  Central	  
Bank	  (ECB),	  Eurostat,	  the	  IMF,	  the	  OECD,	  the	  UN,	  and	  the	  World	  Bank.	  The	  collaboration	  of	  the	  FSB	  and	  the	  
IMF	  is	  another	  prime	  example	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  inter-­‐institutional	  coordination	  will	  impinge	  on	  
implementation	  efforts.	  Indeed,	  both	  bodies	  have	  been	  mandated	  to	  carry	  out	  Early	  Warning	  Exercise	  
(EWE)	  to	  detect	  vulnerabilities	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  system.	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  newly-­‐launched	  
EWE	  will	  thus	  closely	  rely	  on	  how	  well	  the	  two	  bodies	  coordinate	  their	  surveillance	  activities.	  
The	  implementation	  of	  the	  regulatory	  reforms	  adopted	  thus	  far	  will	  also	  face	  domestic-­‐level	  problems.	  The	  
starting	  point	  here	  is	  that,	  much	  like	  other	  global	  regulation,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  rules	  governing	  global	  
finance	  closely	  depends	  on	  domestic	  regulatory	  regimes	  (Mattli	  and	  Woods	  2009:	  3;	  on	  global	  regulation	  
see	  also	  Büthe	  and	  Mattli	  2011	  and	  Djelic	  and	  Sahlin-­‐Andersson	  2006).	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  because	  
much	  of	  global	  financial	  regulation	  is	  best	  characterised	  as	  soft	  law.	  As	  the	  empirical	  findings	  here	  collected	  
have	  shown,	  the	  content	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  regulatory	  reforms	  has	  not	  deviated	  from	  this	  general	  reliance	  
on	  soft	  law.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  conditions	  present	  at	  the	  domestic	  level	  will	  be	  crucial	  for	  financial	  regulation	  
to	  become	  binding.	  Hence,	  differences	  in	  domestic	  financial	  markets	  and	  regulatory	  structures,	  existing	  
legislation	  and	  regulators’	  organisational	  capacities	  will	  certainly	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  pace	  and	  content	  of	  
the	  implementation	  efforts.	  The	  presence	  of	  different	  conditions	  across	  domestic	  regulatory	  settings	  poses	  
the	  risk	  of	  uneven	  or	  partial	  implementation	  of	  the	  regulatory	  reforms	  adopted	  thus	  far.	  Fragmentation	  and	  
potential	  regulatory	  arbitrage	  effects	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  out.	  As	  Quaglia	  notes	  in	  this	  volume,	  ‘in	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  new	  pieces	  of	  [EU]	  legislation,	  their	  effects	  will	  very	  much	  depends	  on	  how	  they	  are	  implemented	  in	  
the	  member	  states.’	  The	  variation	  in	  domestic	  conditions	  also	  poses	  the	  risk	  of	  delays	  in	  implementation.	  
This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  those	  jurisdictions	  where	  the	  domestic	  implementation	  process	  opens	  up	  
several	  access	  points	  to	  the	  lobbying	  of	  the	  financial	  sector,	  with	  the	  United	  States	  being	  an	  apt	  case	  in	  
point	  (cf.	  Singer	  2007;	  see	  also	  Connaughton	  2012).	  These	  observations	  thus	  point	  to	  the	  need	  for	  scholars	  
interested	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  financial	  reform	  to	  monitor	  how	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  important	  –	  
although	  incremental	  –	  reforms	  will	  unfold	  in	  the	  next	  few	  months	  and	  years.	  Furthermore,	  this	  is	  exactly	  
an	  area	  where	  cross-­‐fertilisation	  between	  IPE	  and	  comparative	  political	  economy	  could	  prove	  the	  most	  
promising.	  That	  is,	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  future	  implementation	  patterns,	  we	  need	  both	  an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  global	  financial	  rules	  but	  also	  of	  the	  varieties	  of	  national	  regulatory	  
structures	  that	  ‘mediate’	  the	  international	  rules.	  
Next	  to	  implementation	  problems,	  another	  serious	  challenge	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  regulatory	  
process	  stems	  from	  the	  rise	  to	  the	  prominence	  of	  emerging	  market	  countries	  in	  the	  international	  financial	  
regulatory	  debate.	  Although	  the	  debate	  is	  far	  from	  settled	  on	  whether	  and	  when	  emerging	  markets	  will	  
take	  over	  the	  advanced	  economies	  (c.f.	  Prasad	  and	  Ding	  2011;	  Subramanian	  2011),	  it	  is	  far	  from	  
controversial	  that	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  per	  capita	  income	  in	  emerging	  and	  developing	  economies	  
taken	  as	  a	  whole	  has	  grown	  almost	  three	  times	  as	  fast	  as	  in	  advanced	  economies	  (Derviş	  2012).	  Emerging	  
markets	  have	  therefore	  a	  key	  interest	  in	  ensuring	  that	  their	  economic	  achievements	  are	  not	  undermined	  by	  
global	  financial	  instability,	  as	  has	  been	  the	  case	  since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  crisis.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  decoupling	  
hypothesis	  positing	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  emerging	  markets	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  financial	  shocks	  in	  the	  
advanced	  world,	  emerging	  markets	  have	  been	  put	  under	  severe	  pressure	  by	  the	  developments	  in	  the	  more	  
advanced	  financial	  markets.	  	  	  In	  particular,	  while	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  crisis	  emerging	  markets	  had	  to	  
cope	  with	  severe	  capital	  outflows	  caused	  by	  the	  process	  of	  global	  deleveraging,	  in	  the	  final	  quarters	  of	  
2009,	  the	  easing	  in	  monetary	  conditions	  in	  the	  advanced	  economies	  pushed	  capital	  flows	  in	  the	  opposite	  
direction.	  Since	  then,	  in	  order	  to	  stem	  currency	  appreciation	  and	  asset	  bubbles,	  several	  emerging	  countries,	  
such	  as	  Brazil,	  Chile	  and	  Peru,	  have	  heavily	  intervened	  in	  their	  currency	  markets	  reviving	  memories	  of	  
currency	  wars	  (Financial	  Times,	  Trade	  war	  looming,	  warns	  Brazil,	  10	  January	  2011).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
financial	  stability	  and	  the	  economic	  well-­‐being	  of	  emerging	  market	  countries	  has	  been	  put	  at	  risk	  by	  the	  
‘spill-­‐over’	  effects	  of	  the	  policies	  adopted	  in	  the	  advanced	  economies	  to	  manage	  the	  crisis	  since	  2007.	  
A	  more	  assertive	  role	  for	  emerging	  market	  countries	  in	  the	  international	  financial	  regulatory	  reform	  agenda	  
should	  therefore	  not	  be	  surprising.	  For	  instance,	  these	  countries	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  key	  players	  in	  the	  debate	  
on	  the	  legitimation	  of	  the	  use	  capital	  controls	  (Gallagher,	  Griffith-­‐Jones,	  and	  Ocampo	  2011).	  This	  group	  of	  
countries	  also	  has	  key	  interests	  in	  other	  items	  in	  the	  international	  regulatory	  agenda,	  from	  the	  measures	  to	  
ensure	  the	  safety	  of	  banking	  systems	  to	  those	  to	  curb	  speculation	  on	  commodity	  and	  food	  prices.4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  For	  the	  role	  of	  the	  US	  in	  regulations	  over	  agricultural	  derivatives	  markets	  see	  Helleiner	  and	  Clapp	  (2011).	  
Emerging	  markets’	  potential	  growing	  assertiveness	  is	  also	  justified	  in	  light	  of	  the	  discredit	  brought	  on	  
advanced	  economies’	  financial	  system	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  crisis.	  It	  is	  now	  abundantly	  clear	  that,	  although	  
many	  factors	  contributed	  to	  the	  crisis,	  weak	  regulation	  played	  a	  primary	  role.	  Indeed,	  the	  countries	  where	  
the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  originated	  had	  weaker	  regulation	  and	  supervisory	  practices	  (for	  example,	  less	  
stringent	  definitions	  of	  capital,	  less	  stringent	  provisioning	  requirements,	  and	  greater	  reliance	  on	  banks’	  own	  
risk	  assessment),	  as	  well	  as	  less	  scope	  for	  market	  incentives	  (for	  example,	  lower	  quality	  of	  financial	  
information	  made	  publicly	  available,	  more	  generous	  deposit	  insurance	  coverage)	  (World	  Bank	  2012,	  ch.	  2).	  
	  In	  short,	  the	  crisis	  hit	  hardest	  the	  countries	  where	  regulation	  was	  weaker–	  and	  the	  weakest	  ones	  belong	  to	  
the	  group	  of	  the	  advanced	  economies	  in	  contrast	  to	  what	  had	  happened	  in	  the	  1990s.	  At	  that	  time,	  the	  
post-­‐crisis	  financial	  architecture	  exercise	  was	  dominated	  by	  the	  G7	  countries	  and	  their	  leadership	  was	  
amply	  justified	  in	  light	  of	  the	  financial	  weaknesses	  that	  the	  crisis	  exposed	  in	  the	  emerging	  markets	  (c.f.	  
Baker	  2006).	  Should	  we	  follow	  the	  same	  script	  today,	  emerging	  markets	  should	  play	  a	  more	  decisive	  role	  in	  
the	  post-­‐crisis	  financial	  regulatory	  reform	  process.	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  for	  the	  BRICS	  whose	  financial	  
support	  has	  been	  courted	  more	  or	  less	  explicitly	  by	  several	  advanced	  economies	  especially	  in	  Europe.	  
As	  such,	  one	  important	  future	  line	  of	  research	  lies	  in	  shedding	  light	  on	  the	  role	  of	  emerging	  markets	  in	  the	  
international	  regulatory	  debate	  and	  its	  likely	  trajectory	  and	  implications.	  In	  this	  connection,	  it	  will	  be	  
increasingly	  important	  to	  know	  more	  about	  the	  domestic	  political	  economies	  of	  these	  emerging	  players	  in	  
global	  financial	  governance.	  In	  other	  words,	  while	  the	  literature	  on	  global	  financial	  governance	  and	  
regulation	  has	  primarily	  focused	  on	  the	  political	  economic	  characteristics	  of	  the	  advanced	  economies	  in	  
general	  and	  key	  jurisdictions	  in	  particular	  (such	  as	  the	  US	  and	  the	  European	  Union),	  future	  studies	  may	  no	  
longer	  ignore	  political	  economic	  developments	  in	  the	  emerging	  market	  countries.	  Besides,	  we	  need	  to	  
know	  more	  about	  the	  interest	  group	  politics,	  regulatory	  practices	  and	  ideas	  in	  these	  countries	  to	  make	  
sense	  of	  their	  role	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  regulatory	  debate.	  This	  knowledge	  is	  all	  the	  more	  needed	  in	  light	  
of	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  membership	  in	  several	  regulatory	  committees	  that	  have	  been	  decided	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  
the	  crisis.	  Indeed,	  since	  2008,	  the	  Basel	  Committee	  for	  Banking	  Supervision	  expanded	  from	  13	  member	  
countries	  (all	  developed	  economies)	  to	  27	  (of	  which	  10	  are	  emerging	  economies).	  The	  Committee	  on	  the	  
Global	  Financial	  System	  also	  expanded	  from	  13	  to	  22	  countries	  including	  Brazil,	  China,	  Hong	  Kong,	  India,	  
Mexico,	  Singapore,	  and	  South	  Korea.	  The	  shift	  from	  the	  FSF	  to	  the	  FSB	  has	  also	  been	  accompanied	  by	  
membership	  expansion	  from	  11	  countries	  to	  24	  countries,	  of	  which	  10	  are	  emerging	  economies	  in	  addition	  
to	  Hong	  Kong,	  Singapore,	  and	  South	  Korea.	  In	  December	  2010,	  the	  IMF	  has	  also	  adopted	  a	  significant	  
realignment	  of	  its	  quota	  shares.	  Although	  the	  reform	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  approved	  by	  the	  required	  majority	  
to	  enter	  into	  force,	  once	  enacted,	  it	  will	  result	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  four	  largest	  emerging	  economies	  
(Brazil,	  China,	  India,	  and	  Russia)	  among	  the	  Fund’s	  ten	  largest	  shareholders.	  
This	  membership	  expansion	  brings	  with	  it	  a	  potential	  risk	  of	  heterogeneity	  of	  preferences	  among	  the	  actors	  
that	  are	  involved	  in	  financial	  negotiations	  –	  a	  development	  that	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  prevailing	  
homogeneity	  that	  has	  characterised	  global	  financial	  governance	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  (Helleiner	  and	  
Pagliari	  2011:	  183).	  Future	  research	  will	  thus	  need	  to	  investigate	  whether	  such	  heterogeneity	  will	  become	  
an	  asset	  to	  improve	  the	  rules	  that	  govern	  global	  finance	  or	  an	  obstacle	  to	  any	  decision.	  	  
Finally,	  another	  great	  puzzle	  for	  future	  research	  agendas	  in	  global	  financial	  governance	  relates	  to	  	  the	  role	  
of	  the	  states	  and	  public	  authority	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  that	  of	  the	  markets	  (Germain	  2010)	  and	  the	  resilience	  of	  pre-­‐
crisis	  economic	  ideas,	  and	  in	  particular,	  those	  associated	  with	  the	  	  ‘neoliberal’	  orthodoxy.	  The	  failure	  to	  
abandon	  the	  economic	  theoretical	  basis	  of	  financial	  governance,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  events	  that	  have	  been	  
unfolding	  since	  2007,	  is	  indeed	  one	  the	  great	  puzzles	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  debate	  (cf.	  Crouch	  2011).	  Our	  
analysis	  and	  the	  empirical	  insights	  of	  this	  volume	  show	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  nuance	  on	  this	  issue,	  including	  on	  the	  
importance	  of	  differentiating	  between	  form	  and	  policy	  content	  when	  discussing	  financial	  reforms.	  As	  such,	  
future	  research	  may	  also	  focus	  on	  whether	  incrementalism	  and	  layering	  have	  altered	  neoliberal	  ideas-­‐
derived	  practices	  in	  financial	  governance.	  Finally,	  following	  the	  ultimate	  regulatory	  outcomes	  of	  the	  issues	  
areas	  studied	  in	  this	  book	  (and	  others)	  will	  lead	  to	  clearer	  understandings	  on	  whether	  we	  can	  expect	  any	  
further	  shifts	  in	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	  the	  governors	  of	  finance,	  with	  technocratic	  expert	  networks	  coming	  to	  
share	  governing	  space	  with	  new	  actors	  and	  with	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  politicisation	  of	  finance	  leading	  to	  more	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